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The e-Voting application used in Local Staff Committee Elections


The e-Voting application used in Local Staff Committee Elections


For more than 3 years now, SID has being pointing out to staff the problems of the e-Voting system, used in the Commission in Brussels and Luxembourg, for Local Staff Committee elections.

We have argued that the system:
- was not secure.
- may have affected the result of the L.S.C. elections in Luxembourg 2007.
- was not transparent
- was distrusted by a certain number of staff.

We also pointed out that the German Constitutional court has found e-Voting unconstitutional and in Ireland plans to introduce e-Voting were abandoned after several years of testing, during which many e-Votes went missing!

Then, on May 27th, we received a copy of the report produced by the Brussels CLP Electoral Office (E.O.) dated 13-August-2009, into the 2009 CLP elections.

In this document, it states:
- Le B.E. préconise en particulier l'introduction dans le Règlement électoral d'une disposition permettant la présence soit à titre de membres du Bureau électoral, soit à titre d'observateurs de personnes ayant des compétences informatiques leur permettant de suivre l'ensemble des opérations électorales électroniques.

We fully support this request, for the L.S.C. election regulations in Luxembourg, as well. We also wonder, how the E.O. in Luxembourg in 2007 was able to approve the e-Voting system, if they had nobody on the E.O. with the necessary skills to read and understand the programming code!

We suggest that a panel of external IT experts be assembled, perhaps from some of the Universities in Belgium and Luxembourg, that have Computer Science faculties. This should ensure a more transparent, democratic and trusted system.

However, we are yet to be persuaded that a system like the one put in place by DIGIT is secure, and we agree with the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) in its 2004 evaluation of E-voting systems in the USA; "that the best solutions are voting systems having a voter-verifiable audit trail, where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter."

Finally, SID would like to know why all staff in Brussels and Luxembourg were not officially informed about the problem which occurred with the counting module of the e-Voting application, during the 2009 CLP elections in Brussels?

Created by: admin last modification: Friday 04 of June, 2010 [12:15:34 UTC] by admin

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