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Ind Pre Demo 01

Industrial Pre-democracy in the EC
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This paper was written in 2002, b e f o r e the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified.

Certain details have been changed at Lisbon, but the essence of the analysis remains valid.





Q: The interest in, and moves towards, industrial democracy are shaped by the interest in, and discussions of, ways of involving citizens in democratic and participative decision-making processes...Long-term management strategies are beginning to realise that openness, transparency and involvement of workers or their representatives in decision-making affects the economic viability and success of the enterprise."

Discuss this statement in the light of recent developments in the EU to involve workers and/or their representatives in policy and decision-making procedures in the undertaking.

Industrial Pre-democracy in the EC
Table of Contents Page
Introduction 3
Political and Industrial Democracy 3
Industrial Democracy in Germany 5
Participation on the Supervisory Board 6
Participation through the Works Council 7
Section Summary 7
The Politics of Industrial Democracy 8
The Economics of Industrial Democracy 10
Cross sectional Comparisons 10
Longitudinal Comparisons 13
Section Summary 14
Industrial Pre-democracy in the EC 14
Declarations and legislative texts 14
"Employee Participation and Company Structure" 14
Collective Redundancies 15
Transfer of Undertakings and Businesses 16
Inform Employees about their Contracts 16
Collective Redundancies; the First Reform 17
European Works Council Directive 18
Renault/Vilvoorde Affair 19
Davignon Report 20
Partnership for a New Organisation of Work 22
BMW/Rover Affair 22
Employee Involvement in the European Company 23
Information and Consultation of Workers 24
Protection of Workers' Personal Data 25
Section Summary 26
Conclusion 26
Bibliograph 28
Online Documents 31


Introduction

This paper examines the following questions. Where, in the border region between politics and economics is industrial democracy located? How and why did it develop in Germany? How does it relate to its older brother, political democracy? Is it bad, indifferent or good for a company's economic viability and success?

The balance of the paper is devoted to a chronological review over the last twenty-five years of EC progress from nothing at all to a system of industrial pre-democracy.

Political and Industrial Democracy

European societies use two systems for taking collective decisions. Political questions are decided through the democratic process and the economic ones are left to the market. There is no consensus regarding objective criteria for distinguishing the political from the economic, and many controversial questions are answered by both collective decision systems. It is rare that both answers are identical.

Industrial democracy is the attempt to decide certain microeconomic questions with democratic methods. The term is most often applied at the establishment and enterprise level. Other terms, such as social dialogue, are usually applied to democratic methods at sector or national level to macroeconomic questions. Controversies about industrial democracy are common because shareholders and managers have a great deal of influence on microeconomic decisions within their enterprise while being outnumbered by the workforce. Thus a step toward industrial democracy is accompanied by a shift of power from shareholders to workers.

Various rights to information and consultation are discussed below, because in the EC, industrial democracy has scarcely begun to approach co-decision. There is a school of thought that proposes to progress from information to consultation, and then to participation, as co-decision is often called. The appeal of this discourse is that it resembles the progress from easy to intermediate and finally to very difficult exercises, but this is trap for the unwary.

Long term experience and common sense suggest that in the absence of co-determination, information and consultation will remain formalities with no perspective of developing further because, being human, nearly all shareholders and managers strive to hold on to power. Information and consultation should be classified as industrial pre-democratic rights, leaving co-determination as the key right in the democratic workplace. The two pre-democratic rights need the intervention of some other factor before the leap to industrial democracy can be made. Once there is enforceable participation in the decision process for worker representatives, consultation and information develop, albeit slowly. When a group of managers and representatives begin to make joint decisions, each side with its veto power, sharing information and ideas becomes their best strategy to avoid confrontation and deadlock. After the door to enforceable participation has been opened, information and consultation look more reassuring than threatening.

When the democratic process is to be exported from politics into the management of an enterprise there is a seeming plausibility in evaluating that proposal on the basis of management science considerations. Like other immigrants, industrial democracy might be asked to adapt to its new home, or please leave. This discourse is another trap. Opinions about where to draw the line between politics and business vary from country to country, from decade to decade. Wherever that line happens to be fixed, shareholders and their representatives cross over into politics continuously without apologising for the intrusion. The most that should be conceded to the opponents of industrial democracy is that if they could scientifically prove that democracy was seriously detrimental to the viability of enterprises, that would probably end the debate in their favour. The proponents can pragmatically reject the burden of proof because the opposition devotes much energy and ingenuity to demolishing what it sees as a threat to prosperity.

Industrial Democracy in Germany

Fourteen Member States have laws on participation that give from zero to one quarter or one third of the votes the various boards of companies to employee representatives. It is only in Germany that they may hold half or very nearly half of the seats. The co-determination rights of German works councils also surpass comparable rights in other Member States. Because European industrial democracy is concentrated in Germany, its study should focus on that country.

The first act governing employee participation was introduced into the Reichstag in 1891 by conservative Members. Social democrats and trade unionists opposed the new law at first, but came to appreciate its advantages with the passage of time. By 1920 the positions had been reversed, with the labour movement in favour of the Weimar Republic's Works Councils Act and the conservative majority obtaining compromises that served to limit its application.



Participation on the Supervisory Board

The Coal and Steel Co-Determination? Act came into force in 1951. It mandated full parity between the representatives of labour and capital on the supervisory board by reserving half of the seats for each side. Worker representatives obtained a right to veto the appointment of the labour director who sits on the management board.

The labour movement sought to spread this form of participation to all enterprises and pushed for the extension of the Coal and Steel Co-Determination? Act to other sectors of industry. The Works Constitution Act of 1952 was a disappointment to these aspirations because it gave only one third of the seats on the supervisory board of companies with five hundred or more employees to their representatives. In practice, sub-parity participation brought no substantial advantage over simple consultation because shareholders representatives usually presented a united front to their social partners.

Two decades of low-intensity, but continuous campaigning brought a compromise between the two models of participation. The reform of the Works Constitution Act in 1976 provided for an equal number of representatives for both sides on the supervisory board, the chair reserved for a shareholder representative who may cast an extra vote in case of tie. This is near-parity co-determination.


Participation through the Works Council

The revolution of 1918 led to the establishment of several council republics (Räterepubliken) which were suppressed by rightwing militias (Freikorps) during the course of 1919. The Works Council Act of 1920 (along with the 40 hour week) was part of a long term strategy of social compromise.

Workers, at least in the conventional sense of the word, were conspicuously absent from the protests of 1968. Most of the rebels were university students, then often seen as the next generation of managers, engineers and scientists. Their anger at the society which was grooming them to be the future elite had an impact that went beyond what their sheer numbers would lead one to expect. The reform of the Works Constitution Act that followed these protests was, as in 1920, a post-conflict compromise. The shareholders ceded some of their management's' prerogatives in exchange for stability and cooperation in their companies.

The 1972 reform of the Works Constitution Act gave extensive co-determination rights to the works council. Inter alia they apply to human resource decisions (including dismissals), questions of working time and of monitoring of staff by management.


Section Summary of
Industrial Democracy in Germany

Industrial democracy has been developing in Germany for circa a century. First, one sees that industrial democracy can be developed under adverse circumstances. Second, the pattern has been a succession of decades of slow progress followed by breakthroughs and then more years spent advancing at snail's pace.

“The system of works constitution is probably the most important characteristic of labour law in Germany. It has implications for virtually all aspects of individual and collective labour law.”

The politics of industrial democracy

The formal democratic deficits in some Member States have perhaps contributed to apathy, but not rebellion.

Three substantial deficits in democracy provided a stronger impetus for change. First was the loss of contact between citizens and the large political parties. More often than not, citizens with clear policy preferences regarding newly emerging issues (feminism, decolonisation, nuclear energy in its military and civilian guise, war prevention, environmental protection) found no place for their vote on the ballot. Second was the growth of media power, symbolised by men like Springer, Murdoch, Berlusconi who were sometimes thought to have more influence on the government than the constitution allowed. Third was the growing awareness that government criminality was real and all too common; Kohl, Mitterrand, Chirac, Craxi, Andreotti, Berlusconi.

There was room for an increase in democracy in Europe, but steady erosion of enthusiasm for that system became a threat to long-term survival and called for a remedy.

The very term "Works Constitution" suggests that business establishments should have a constitution, somewhat similar to the sixteen constitutions of the Länder, because a company is ultimately a small sub-unit of the Federal Republic. Of course, this sub-constitution is less democratic than the Basic Law, but it is orientated to the division and limitation of power. Two organised, structured powers, capital and labour, enter into a long-term relation. The capital side has more rights than labour, but it does not have all rights. The practice of industrial democracy promotes, at least, a better understanding between the groups at the top of society's hierarchy and those below.



In 1994 Germany had circa 220.000 counsellors in 40.000 works councils. In the smallest municipalities direct contact between the electorate and local politicians occurs naturally. But this becomes impossible in towns and cities, where the works counsellors are the elected representatives who have the closest link with their constituents. They serve to anchor democratic values in the everyday lives of people who switch channels as soon as politician's face appears on the screen.


The Economics of Industrial Democracy

Cross sectional comparisons

Germany has by far the most highly developed system of worker representation and has been successful economically, at least until reunification in October 1990. But Switzerland has nearly no industrial democracy and still manages to thrive. But the conclusions drawn from an inter country comparison need to be interpreted with caution. One can simply note that Germany climbed from ruin up to the G7 while practising more industrial democracy than its competitors.

Personal services are the sector of the German economy that is most affected by unemployment and that has the lowest density of works councils and other forms of worker participation. The most competitive sector of the German economy is large-scale manufacturers who have a high density of works councils and who operate under near-parity if not under full-parity co-determination. This observation can refute the idea that industrial democracy always harms productivity, but it cannot be taken further than that.

The best hope of obtaining conclusive results lies in comparing companies with co-determination to those without. The effect of works councils on personnel turnover has been statistically analysed on the basis of a sample of 2.392 private sector firms over a period of two years. The raw data were very impressive: 7.8% dismissals in co-determined firms against 14.6% in firms run only by management for a difference of 6.8%. Companies with participation are far from being a random sample of all German companies, so a number of corrections had to be applied in order to filter out the effects of other causal factors. With those corrections, the participative companies still had a dismissal rate that was 2.9 percentage points lower.

Voluntary quits were studied in the same way. The raw numbers were 10.4% to 15.7%, giving a gross difference of 5.3% and leaving a net difference of 2.4 percentage points.

The right to veto the dismissal of a colleague is one of the works council's most important tools. Without works council consent a dismissal has no legal effect and management must sue the unwanted worker before an industrial tribunal in order to overturn the works council's veto. This sharp tool is used in only 14% of the dismissals on average over all German works councils, showing that the lower rate for co-determined companies is not simply the effect of a systematic ban on all dismissals. The works council cannot stop voluntary quits, yet its presence in the company has a statistically significant effect on them as well.

Barring undiscovered errors, it can be concluded that works councils lower personnel turnover. The reliable result of the study is that works councils seem to cause a 2.6 % lower annual turnover rate. It is possible to reason further on this basis, without lapsing into mere speculation. Supposing that a company with a works council competes against one that is controlled unilaterally by management and that both have one hundred employees. At the end of each two year period the authoritarian company will have replaced five workers more than the industrially democratic one. Further conclusions depend on what sector the competition is taking place in. In the fast food industry there may a small net advantage for the authoritarian competitor because the cost of bringing a newly recruited worker up to full productivity is low and may be outweighed by the fear-instilled increases in discipline. In the high tech sector the loss five out of one hundred qualified knowledge workers will take a heavy toll. If all five defect to the more democratic competitor, the effect can be serious. This consideration helps to explain the remarkably strong correlation between participation and qualification of the workforce in economic terms.



Longitudinal comparisons

In Germany, participation began in 1891. Leaving the twelve years of fascism to the side as irrelevant, over a century of experience is available. One may note the obvious: no evidence links downturns of the national economy to increases in participation over this time.

During those hundred years German companies were started, they competed and some went out of business. If co-determination had a negative effect on competitiveness, there should be a steady increase of authoritarian companies at the expense of the more democratic ones. This does not hold true in general, but between 1984 and 1994, the percentage of private companies practising participation through a works council or through representatives on the supervisory board declined from 50% to 40%. Several factors other than inter-company competition were at work: downsizing and the reorganisation of large companies into networks of smaller ones often removed them from the scope of mandatory near-parity representation, the incumbent federal government was at best indifferent to industrial democracy, fear of unemployment made German workers ever more docile. The decline in relative numbers contrasts with an uninterrupted increase in the absolute number of both companies and workers complying with 1976 Works Constitution Act. This trend is too short and too weak to support any sweeping generalisations.


Section Summary of
The economics of Industrial Democracy

The balance of the examined evidence suggests that industrial democracy slightly enhances the economic viability and success of enterprises. As a matter of intellectual honesty: the demonstrated economic benefits, taken by themselves, are too slight to justify such a fundamental reform project.

Industrial Pre-democracy in the EC

Declarations and Legislative Texts

There is, of course, no industrial democracy in the EC yet. By examining eleven Community texts which treat the rights to information and consultation, progress from one milestone to the next will be traced.

“Employee Participation and Company Structure”

In 1975 the draftsmen recognised that some broadly desirable economic changes might at least appear to be more difficult with employee participation, but they went on to state that “for sophisticated, industrial societies, there is no alternative, if they are to retain their democratic character”. This position was never refuted subsequently, it was simply set aside.



Collective Redundancies

The first step toward, but not into, industrial democracy was taken in February 1975 when the Council passed Directive 75/129/EEC.

Some situations and some groups of workers were excluded in Article 2, Paragraph 2. Sailors on sea-going vessels were not protected. The text gave no hint of an explanation why other transport workers, including highly paid airline pilots, deserved more protection than seamen. It was more serious that all government workers, and all those working for "bodies or establishments governed by public law (or, in Member States where this concept is unknown, by equivalent bodies)" are left without the Directive's modest protection, because these groups often form a quarter, and sometimes more of a Member State's national workforce. It seems that ministers meeting in Council refused to take on the obligations that they were imposing on private employers.

The employer triggers the Directive by contemplating collective redundancies. Most employers remembered to inform and consult before terminating contracts and so fulfilled their obligation, at least no could prove otherwise. The only risk that negligent bosses ran was to have their minimum waiting period of thirty days extended in accordance with Article 4, Paragraph 3.



Transfer of Undertakings and Businesses

In February 1977 Council passed Directive 77/187/EEC which followed the example of a 1928 French law by preserving the employees' contractual rights when the old employer was replaced by a buyer or an heir.

Section III provided for the two pre-democratic rights in cases where undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses were transferred from one owner to the next. In contrast with Directive 75/187/EEC, it was not clear what the consultations should or could lead to. The main body of the Directive protected the employment contracts up to the moment after the transfer had taken place. Then the new employer was free to terminate or renegotiate them within the limits of the law. Section III had no further protective effect. If consistency with Directive 75/129/EEC had been intended, something like the protection of certain rights for the duration of a transition period could have been added to the text as the goal of the consultation. There was an impression that Section III was appended to the main text as an afterthought.

Article 1, Paragraph 3 excluded "sea-going vessels" from the application of the Directive. Public sector workers were, however, not excluded.

Informing Employees about their Contracts

Council Directive 91/533/EEC was adopted in October of 1991. Article 2, Paragraph 2(c)(ii) gave the employee the right to "a brief specification or description of the work". Subsequent litigation, against an employer who attempted to prove that a written job description which he had provided could not bind him, because he had made a mistake which escaped his own notice for several years, showed that the Directive was needed in practice. In this way, another piece of the rule of law was imposed on the employers, preparing the workplace for the arrival of democracy.


Collective Redundancies; the First Reform

After the passage of the Social Chapter, Council reformed the Collective Redundancies Directive by means of Directive 92/56/EEC in June 1992. Most of the changes were devoted to information and consultation rights; experts could now be made available to workers' representatives, five pieces of information to be provided were spelled-out, administrative and/or judicial procedures to enforce compliance were provided for.

In the context of the social market economy, even the improved Directive was humorously compared to the rearrangement of deckchairs on the Titanic, or at least in the garden of an early retirement home. From the industrial democracy point of view, the Directive could also have to be condemned as useless, but only by observers who were concentrating on short-term results. The changes of 1992 were encouraging, first, because their sheer existence demonstrated a small, but real, commitment to approaching industrial democracy; second, because their nature showed that some attention was being paid to obstacles that were blocking the way.
European Works Council Directive

In September 1994 Council passed Directive 94/45/EC, which was limited to the two pre-democratic rights. From the viewpoint of more fully developed industrial democracy two general criticisms arose. The proposed standards for information and consultation were placed in an annex that followed a sophisticated procedure apparently designed to avoid letting them standards come into force, sending the message that even the two pre-democratic rights were burdens to be lightened as much as possible. The other general criticism was that Directive was too complex to work properly in a real company.

In April 2000 the Commission submitted a report on the application to European Parliament and the Council. With regard to agreements establishing EWCs it noted that "some of these agreements seem to guarantee only a very low level of transnational consultation and information". That outcome was to be expected; consultation and information tend to atrophy and wither away in the absence co-determination.


The Annexe, Article 1, Paragraph b stated that members of the EWC should be "elected or appointed ... by the employees' representatives or, in absence thereof, by the entire body of employees". That made the EWC Members representatives of representatives rather than of constituents, thereby minimising democracy.

There were a number of subtle improvements, which began with Article 3's definition of a "controlling undertaking". This was an attempt to block escape from the EWC by the means of re-organising undertakings in law but not in fact. Article 2 of the Annexe gave a list of topics for information and consultation. The last sentence of the Annexe's Article 2 was candid about the information and consultation meeting which "shall not affect the prerogatives of the central management". That transparency was a step forward. Further down, Article 4 gave the EWC Members the right to hold meetings without managers monitoring them. That break with French law and practice implied progress in the face of the Council's traditional preference for consensus. Finally Article 7 provided that central management would pay the EWC's operating expenses.


Renault/Vilvoorde Affair

In February 1997 Renault announced the closure of its Vilvoorde assembly plant without having informed or consulted the EWC or the workforce. Management admitted freely that the plant was productive and profitable but insisted that it could not reverse its decision because the closure was part of a much needed streamlining operation. As though to prove its point, it announced another three thousand redundancies in France the next day. The reaction to these announcements were a demonstration of at least 40.000 people and a co-ordinated one hour strike that was followed in Belgium, France and Spain. This was the first strike of any size to span several Member States and it was remarked that the familiar strategy of playing off the workforces at the different locations against one another had failed for the first time.

One factor that aggravated the situation was that Volkswagen had already concluded a works agreement which saved thirty thousand jobs by accepting a 16% pay reduction in exchange for the four day week. No one believed in the inevitability of the closure, especially when it became more widely known that the French government controlled 47% of the Renault shares.

Neither the Directive on EWCs nor the one on collective redundancies would have changed the outcome if they had been respected by management because they both stop short of co-determination. Under the German systems of near-parity and even of sub-parity co-determination there might have been a coalition between government and worker representatives on the supervisory board. That would have resulted in 97% or at least 77% of the votes being cast against closure. This scenario highlights the under-development of industrial democracy at Community level. Participation cannot shield jobs from global competition, but it can protect them from being destroyed without any immediate necessity by shareholders and their managers.

Davignon Report

This report on systems of worker involvement in the European Company was published two decades after the Green Paper on employee participation, in May 1997. It described the role of industrial democracy in distinctly microeconomic terms:
"The type of labour needed by European companies - skilled, mobile, committed, responsible, and capable of using technical innovations and of identifying with the objective of increasing competitiveness and quality - cannot be expected simply to obey the employer's instructions. Workers must be closely and permanently involved in decision-making at all levels of the compan".

This line of argument gave less support to participation than the political discussion in the 1975 Green Paper. It allowed the group of experts to write that "Failure to negotiate an agreement on participation in the European Company must not preclude incorporation as a European Company, since this would have the effect of removing the owner's right to decide on the company's legal form and transferring it to the workforce." This was not entirely logical because transferring the right to choose the company's legal form would mean that the workers would make that choice unilaterally, perhaps without consulting or informing the shareholders. The Davignon experts seem to have confounded industrial democracy with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This confusion probably lead them to propose that 20%, but at least two, of members of the supervisory or management board should represent the workforce. Judging by German experience, this would lead to no co-determination, although it would be a valuable source of information and it could develop into a forum for consultation, if management were supportive.



Partnership for a New Organisation of Work

The green paper on the new organisation of work was adopted in April 1997. Paragraphs 10, 23 and 44 mentioned the importance of participation without going any further than that.

The draftsmen clearly had little time for industrial democracy, yet they provided some evidence for its necessity. Paragraph 47, concerning new wage systems, mentioned the possibility of "supplements to the basic wage paid according to results or for continuous improvements". In the absence of a functioning works council, managers might have decided that workers no longer deserved supplementary payments after they had improved to the limit of their ability because the continuous improvement had ended.

The BMW/Rover Affair

Neither an EWC nor even a German works council has co-determination over plant ownership. There are information and consultation rights, and in Germany there is an enforceable right to influence the size and structure of the severance package that may become necessary. Under the near-parity form of co-determination staff representatives can and usually do vote against such measures, but to no avail.

Therefore, the abrupt sale of Rover Cars to the Phoenix Consortium for £10 in 2000, flagrantly violated even the information and consultation rights, but nothing more than that was lost. Attempts to reinforce consultation and information in the absence of co-determination are doomed to failure whenever there is the perception of a serious threat to the survival of the enterprise, as was the case with BMW.

Employee Involvement in the European Company

Council Directive 2001/86/EC of October 2001 advanced beyond the Davignon Report on some points while falling short on others. The report stressed that all board members should be equal, including worker representatives, but the Directive gave them no co-determination unless they already have that right before the company is transformed or merged into a European Company.

The right to withhold information is the opposite of the right to access it. Article 8, Paragraph 2 allowed the Directive to be implemented with guaranteed right to secrecy for managers. That right could be granted without making it subject to prior authorisation by any independent or public body. It would be very difficult to enforce the right to information under such circumstances.

Article 11 prohibited the abuse of the Directive for reducing existing rights to involvement, tacitly admitting that it was well below best practice in industrial democracy.

The Directive goes beyond Davignon by introducing a number of minimum requirements. The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Directive describes the debates between the social partners that took place before the Commission took matters in its own hands. The resistance that UNICE put against any directive at all gave the steps beyond Davignon an added importance that will surprised the casual observer.

Information and Consultation of Workers

In March 2002 Council passed Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for the two pre-democratic rights of employees in the European Community. There had been a subtle improvement regarding secrecy between Directive 2001/86/EC and the present one. The workers representatives in a European Company were bound to keep company secrets by Article 8, Paragraph 1. Article 6, while Paragraph 1 of the present Directive imposed the same restriction, but gave them the right to communicate secrets to third parties who were also bound to secrecacy. This allowed representatives to consult lawyers and other experts without fear of breaking the law.

The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal for the Directive was silent on the, by now familiar, permission to exclude the crews of vessels plying the high seas from the rights given to the rest of us, in Article 3 Paragraph 3. It is still difficult to see why sailors are being singled out. Their lives are at risk on board, and they can be expected to strive for a large measure of industrial safety. It would have been more reasonable to give them more rights with a view to preventing disasters involving ferries and oil tankers. Perhaps the Member State or States who insisted on the derogation obtained a promise of anonymity along with it.

Protection of Workers' Personal Data

The Commission launched the second stage of consultation on data protection in October 2002.

The protection of worker's personal data is closely linked to industrial democracy because it sets limits to managerial power. The consultation document showed signs of progress on some topics and of retrogression on others. There was a move towards describing employment relations as they are in practice rather than as they should be.

Section Summary of
Industrial Pre-democracy in the EC

The term "pre-democracy" serves to emphasise that, so far, there has been no transfer of decision making power from shareholders to workers. The declaratory Community texts became increasingly modest as they began to converge with political reality. But the legislative texts demonstrated a nearly continuous progress toward legal sophistication and practicability. Taken together, these trends imply that there is a political undercurrent in the EC which drags rights to information and consultation away from being hollow formalities in the general direction of useful entitlements.


Conclusion

The German example demonstrates that industrial relations can be democratised even under difficult circumstances, provided there are enough people with a political will to do so.

There is a persistent correlation between the intensity of participation and the sophistication of the industry in question which makes it likely that the forces pushing toward the knowledge society and the industrially democratic one are in synergy. But it has been seen that economic reasons alone are insufficient to justify industrial democracy. In the last analysis, the question is decided by reference to one's fundamental political values.

After a quarter of a century, European industrial relations have advanced through much of their pre-democratic phase. Willy Brandt called on Germans to "Dare Democracy!" ("Demokratie Wagen!"). That remains a challenge to the partners in the EC's social dialogue.

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Online Documents

1. Commission
"Industrial Relations in Europe"
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/news/report_en.htm

2. Commission
Commission reports on implementation of European Works Councils Directive
COM(2000)188 final
May 2000
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/labour/news/report_en.htm

3. Commission
Second stage consultations with the Community social partners on the protection of personal data in the employment context
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/labour/index_en.htm

4. Group of Experts
European Systems of Worker Involvement (with regard to the European Company Statute and other pending proposals), the Davignon Report, May 1997
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/labour/davignon/davi_en.htm

5. Kommission Mitbestimmung
(Bertelsmann Stiftung & Hans Böckler Stiftung)
Vorsitzender: Prof. Streeck
Mitbestimmung und neue Unternehmenskulturen
May 1998
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/people/ws/endbericht/

6. Bruyninckx
(european industrial relations observatory online)
The closure of Renault/Vilvoorde
March 1997
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/1997/03/feature/BE9703202F.html

7. Commission
Green Paper - Partnership for a New Organization of Work
April 1997
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/social/green_en.htm


8. Commission
Proposal for a Council Directive (COM(98)612) establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employess in the European Community
Explanatory Memorandum
1998
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/labour/index_en.htm


9. Commission
Second stage consultation of social partners on the protection of workers' personal data
October 2002
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/labour/index_en.htm

Created by: admin last modification: Thursday 28 of March, 2013 [12:27:08 UTC] by admin


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