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To what extent do you think that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has improved the EC equality provisions?
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This paper was written in 2002, b e f o r e the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified.

Certain details have been changed at Lisbon, but the essence of the analysis remains valid.




Module 4, Question 1
“To what extent do you think that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has improved the EC equality provisions?”
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Table of Contents
Introduction 2
Fundamental Rights 2
Equal Pay 3
The Charter’s Genesis 5
The Charter’s Content 8
Restatement 11
The Charter in the Courts 12
Weak References 13
Medium References 14
Strong References 16
The Charter and Equality 18
Conclusion 19





Introduction
A brief overview of the evolution of basic rights in general and of equality in particular is followed by the genesis of the Charter. Then its content, its role as a Restatement and judicial references to several of its articles are considered. Finally the Charter’s connection with equality provisions is analysed in the light of recent case law and conclusions are drawn.

Fundamental Rights
The Treaty that was intended to establish a European Political Community contained a direct reference to Section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR hereafter). After French Parliament refused ratification in 1954 the meaning of the abbreviation "EPC" was eventually reduced to "European Political Cooperation" and it has been a limited cooperation at the best of times. The scope of fundamental rights was reduced on the same scale in an effort to avoid challenging the sovereignty of Member States.

Fifteen years of judicial silence regarding fundamental rights in the EEC followed. In Stauder , with the Commission rather than a Member State as the defendant, the silence was softly broken. Even in 1969, the measure found to violate a fundamental right was reinterpreted into conformity, but not annulled. Next year, in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft , the Court of Justice anchored rights in the constitutional traditions of the Member States.

Twenty years after the shock caused by the rejection of the European Political Community the Court of Justice cautiously approached the outer perimeter of Member State sovereignty when it added international conventions designed to protect human rights to its list of legal bases in Nold . Naturally, the ECHR became the most important source of those rights.

In 1977 the European Parliament, Commission and Council issued a Joint Declaration in support of the Court's case law on human rights. Another decade later, in 1987, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), "accepted that the protection of fundamental rights under E.C. law had reached the level of German law" .

Summary
Fundamental rights were eliminated from Community law at the outset, but during the next circa thirty years they were re-introduced in sufficient numbers to bring the issue of a list, a bill, or a catalogue of rights back to the political agenda.

Equal Pay
By the time at which the two Treaties of Rome were drafted four of the six founding EEC Member States had ratified ILO Convention No. 100; Luxembourg came on-board in 1967, followed by the Netherlands in 1971. The question of ratification was important in economic terms because the gender pay gap in France at the time was "7% compared to 20-40% in the Netherlands and in Italy". The plight of Italian workers serves to remind that ratification in itself is one step on the way to equal rights, but not the last one. This apparent lack of effect of Convention No. 100 served only to strengthen French pressure for an effective remedy against anti-socially dumping products of underpaid women onto the Common Market.

The primary motivation for inserting Article 141 (then 119) into the Treaty was to protect the competitiveness of French industry, equality was at best a secondary consideration. This was an early example of " 'state feminism', that is, equality laws 'which are neither mobilised for, nor implemented by, women'."
In Defrenne v. SABENA the Court of Justice acknowledged that Article 141 (then 119) had a "double aim"; first to protect those Member States with advanced equality regimes from distortions of competition, second to promote social progress. During the next fifteen years enough social progress was made to allow the Court to hold that the "fundamental objective of equal treatment for men and women, ... is one of the fundamental human rights whose observance the Court has a duty to uphold".
At Amsterdam Article 13 was inserted into the Treaty of the EC. It empowers the EC to "take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex .... " or any of seven other kinds of inequality. The exercise of this new competence is to be decided by the old consultation procedure. The first caveat lies in the marginalisation of the European Parliament, which has traditionally been open to equality demands. The second caveat results from the unanimity in Counsel requirement which will allow the most conservative Member State to set the speed limit on the road to equality, and the soon to be twenty-four other Members to shrug off their responsibility.

But much remained to be done; taking the average over the fifteen Member States in 1999, the Commission reported a salary gap of 25% for the private sector and of 9% for public employees. One can entertain doubts about an equality regime that is only three-quarters enforced after more than three decades. Little doubt remains regarding the 9% in the public sector where governments can enforce equal pay, if not all forms of equality, at the stroke of a pen. Forty years, nine Council Directives, a Treaty Article and an international Convention have helped the European governments to achieve a 91% success-rate in policing themselves.
Summary
Equal pay entered Community law as little more than a measure of competition policy that had been elevated to the status of Treaty of Rome Article 119. From there it developed into a human right, which like other such rights is often respected in practice, but not always.

The Charter’s Genesis
The Treaties could have been drafted in such a way as to permit accession to ECHR, but that was not done. They were modified by the Merger Treaties, by the Single European Act, at Maastricht, Amsterdam and then at Nice, but it remained impossible to incorporate ECHR-friendly changes. EMU and the two recent accessions to the EU demonstrate that Intergovernmental Conferences are capable of taking decisions that are both controversial and complicated. The adoption of the European Social Charter by eleven Member States without the United Kingdom showed what was possible given adequate political will.
The EMU project taken together with rhetoric about an ever-closer union and a European citizenship pushed fundamental rights higher up on the political agenda. EMU involved transferring a considerable amount of practical power to a European institution, which highlighted a need to install checks and balances in the new EU. Article 6 was added at Maastricht, more as a way of publicising the legal position that had emerged from the Court's case law, than as an innovation. Even with this reassurance, the Treaty of Maastricht was rejected by the Danish electorate and came close to disaster in a French referendum. Polls taken at the time showed that the Treaty was being ratified by Parliaments against their electors' will in a number of Member States.

The idea of having the Community accede to the ECHR, which all of its Member States had joined, came to the fore. After a reference under what was then Article 228(6), the Court issued an Opinion to the effect that "as Community law now stands, the Community has no competence to accede to the Convention".

The need to present something more than Article 6 in order to dispel concerns over the democratic deficit became ever more urgent.. By early 1999, the Expert Group on Fundamental Rights could report to Council that "a comprehensive approach to the guarantee of fundamental rights is urgently required" . The Expert Group went on to recommend incorporating the ECHR with additions into Community law. Among the six additions recommended by the Expert Group was "the right to equality of opportunity and treatment without any distinction such as race, colour, ethnic, national, or social origin, culture or language, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, sex or gender, marital status, family responsibilities, sexual orientation, age, or disability". Much of this thinking soon found its way into Treaty Article 13 and into Chapter III of the Charter.

Because intergovernmental methods had failed to produce results during the thirty years leading up to Maastricht, there was the need for a fresh approach. Representatives of four constituencies were selected: one for each Member State government, one from the Commission, sixteen MEPs, plus thirty national MPs. This group of sixty-two was chaired by Roman Herzog, the recently retired head of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Among the observers with an official status representatives from the European Court of Human Rights attended. The group gave itself the title "Convention" at its second meeting. Considering that direct representatives of national governments were outnumbered nearly three to one, it was a significant move beyond the traditional inter-govermentalism. By way of compensation, the governments insisted that the Charter should not be binding, at least not directly on them. One commentator noted that this process was “still far from meeting the standards of democratic constitution-making. It must be regarded as an improvement still far from the normative ideal type.”

When the Convention completed its work, the Charter was endorsed through a solemn declaration by the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council jointly in December 2000.

Summary
For nearly half a century, there was a gap in the place where there should have been an EEC/EC/EU bill of rights. The ECHR was freely available as a patch to cover the rights hole during that period, but the Member States opted for a custom-made patch. Stretching the analogy further, the thread used to sew basic rights onto the EU’s legal system was so fine that some observers had difficulties seeing it with the unaided eye.


The Charter’s Contents
Chapter III of the Charter is entitled "Equality" and contains Article 23 bearing the subtitle "Equality between men and women". It reads "Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex." The words "all areas" take Article 23 well beyond the old Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. Those two words are the culmination of an expansion of the field of application in incremental steps through case law. The second sentence of Article 23 reflects a lesson on the paradox of non-discrimination that was taught by Kalanke . In the aftermath of that judgement, it became known that many people thought it would take some discrimination in order to break discrimination.
Looking beyond the provisions expressly formulated to enhance equality; Chapter V ("Citizen's Rights") contains a number of useful tools. Article 41, subtitled "Right to good administration", grants the right to be heard by the administration, to see one's file, and to have the reasons behind an administrative decision explained. Given the equality provisions in force, a contrary administrative decision would logically have to breach Article 41. The case of Johnston v. Chief Constable has provided an example of the link between good governance and equality long before the Charter.
There is synergy between Articles 23 and 41, the former attacking the substance of discrimination while the later blocks discriminatory procedures. Article 41 applies to the "bodies and institutions of the Union" and so will appear to be of limited scope. But this legal limitation has its political limits in turn. The Charter was said to contain fundamental rights common to all Member State legal orders. Representatives of each Member State participated actively in formulating and solemnly declaring it. It is difficult to see how one or the other of the Member States can openly defend a lower level of protection against administrative abuse than that offered by Article 41. That would involve admitting that the national administration is even worse than Brussels Eurocrats. Once a discriminatory measure has been defeated in the public sector, the next step would be to use provisions such as Article 20 ("Everyone is equal before the law.") to move on into the private sector.
Articles 42 ("Right of access to documents") and 43 ("Ombudsman") are corollaries to Article 41 and can be used in the same way.
Chapter VII, entitled "General Provisions" contains three articles that describe the position of the Charter within and perhaps in between the various legal orders. Article 51(1) says that "the provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity". This is the first addressee. What was said for Article 41specifically in the paragraph immediately above, goes for the whole of the Charter. If a Member State were to resist the application of one of the Charter rights within its national legal system, it would be arguing that it had participated in preparing and promulgating the Charter by mistake and that it now regretted having agreed to "too many" fundamental rights. Politically, it is nearly inconceivable that the government of country X might tell its majority of female citizens, that they will have to settle for less rights than their sisters in fourteen other European countries enjoy.
The second group of Charter addressees in Article 51(1) are "the Member States only when they are implementing Union law". The case law of the Court of Justice is that Member States are bound by fundamental rights guarantees whenever they are acting "within the scope of Community law" , not just when they are implementing it. The meaning of "acting" contains the meaning of "implementing" as a subset, so the case law provides wider protection in this respect. Most of the shortfall of Article 51 behind the case-law will be made good if the promise of better governance which Article 41 expresses is kept. National courts and legislators are already bound to promote equality within the scope of Community law. As seen above, Article 41 will probably lead to politically enforced minimum standards of good governance.

It is obvious that the scope of "Union law" is broader than that of "Community law" because it encompasses all three pillars. In this second respect, Article 51(1) turns out to be broader than the Court's case law.
Article 51(2) says "This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.” In view of Article 6 TEU and of the fact that it still takes an intergovernmental conference to modify the Treaties, this is a loose restriction. Article 52(1) deals with the possibility of limiting the scope of the exercise of Charter rights and freedoms through law. Neither of these paragraphs will be obstacles to equality litigation.
Article 52(2) reads "Rights recognised by this Charter which are based on the Community Treaties or the Treaty on European Union shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.” This will stop efforts to squeeze extra rights out of Article 23 in those areas where it overlaps with the Article 141 TEC. Like Article 51(2), it is inter alia an acknowledgement of Opinion 94/2.
Article 52(3) deals with the overlap between the ECHR and the Charter by providing that for rights found in both the Charter and the Convention "the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.” The second and final sentence of Article 52(3) is "This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”
Summary
The text of Article 23 of the Charter greatly expands the scope of European equality law and nothing in the general provisions takes back any of this progress. The citizens’ rights of Charter chapter III can help to nudge complacent administrators into pro equality actions.

Restatement
In an early assessment of the Charter Bob Hepple considers the possibility of its being eventually incorporated into the Treaties and continues "But even short of actual incorporation, the Charter is unlikely to be devoid of legal effects. ... The Charter will give European judges a clear and systematic statement of rights which have been endorsed at the highest
at the highest political level."
During the second half of the twentieth century, the acquis communautaire grew into a maquis communautaire. This festering of text was noted as early as 1965, in the preamble to the Merger Treaty. The EU is not alone with the problem of seemingly uncontrollable growth in complexity because, due to federalism with its extensive state powers and because of a much longer history and more diverse population, the law of the USA has grown, if anything, more complex than European law. The American Law Institute was set up in 1923 for the express purpose of producing and publishing "Restatements". A Restatement is a legal text, resembling a codification that reformulates and summarises general principles derived from the case material. The purpose is to clarify and systematise in order to make the work of lawyers and even of courts more efficient and transparent.
In an article published in 1999 Schmid writes of Restatements that "Such a legal text is meant to incorporate all valid law regardless of its legislative or judicial origin, in particular the ECJ' famous constitutionalisation doctrines; even a catalogue of human rights as recognised by the ECJ in its jurisprudence could possible be included." (Emphasis added.) The Restatements, which are produced by legal scholars in their capacity as citizens, are considered to have more authority than a simple legal textbook, though less than the primary sources. Still, on rare occasions, American courts have based their judgements exclusively on a Restatement.
The first six chapters of the Charter with their fifty concise articles are clear enough to be used as part of a restatement of EU fundamental rights, although the four articles of the seventh chapter would benefit from a clarification. What were called the "weak references" to the Charter are examples of the Courts using it as reference material.
Summary
Providing such an aide memoire to jurists gives a certain boost to equality and other rights because it reduces the costs of litigation on the average and over the long-term. This effect of making it faster, cheaper and easier to protect equality rights is subtle enough to defy straightforward measurement or calculation. But the residual pay gaps of 25% and 9% lead one to estimate that a certain untapped potential for equality litigation remains half a century after the Member States began to ratify ILO Convention 100.

The Charter in the Courts
The Advocates General and the Judges of both the Court of First Instance and of the Court of Justice have mentioned the Charter in numerous opinions and judgements. Their references can be categorised as weak, medium or strong. "Weak" references are those where a point has already been substantiated through a reference to an Article of the ECHR or of a Treaty and the Charter is used as one more piece of evidence, which is nice to have but not essential. "Medium" references are those where the Charter provides the sole piece of supporting evidence for a given conclusion, with the Court noting the non-binding nature of the Charter, and going on to emphasise that it is bound to enforce human rights. A "strong" reference is one in which parts of the Charter are used as the only support for an assertion and where words like "non-binding" do not appear.
Weak References
Weak references are the least interesting category. One example is
" ... Such a result entails infringement of the right to property, which is recognised to be a fundamental human right in the Community legal order, protected by the first subparagraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU."
Another example is " ... In addition to Article 8 of the ECHR see also the comparable, but non-binding, Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the EU." .

Some of the weak references shade into the next-stronger category;
"On the basis of the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion must be that the procedures provided for in, on the one hand, Article 234 EC and, on the other hand, Article 235 EC and the second paragraph of Article 288 EC can no longer be regarded, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as guaranteeing persons the right to an effective remedy enabling them to contest the legality of Community measures of general application which directly affect their legal situation."
Two Articles of the ECHR are being used to reinforce Article 47 of the Charter, but the purpose is to conclude that three Treaty Articles violate the fundamental right to sound administration.

Medium References
Here is an example of a medium reference;
"The right to an effective remedy for everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has, moreover, been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, ... . Although this document does not have legally binding force, it does show the importance of the rights it sets out in the Community legal order."
Another example;
" ... Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, while itself not legally binding, proclaims a generally recognised principle in stating in Article 47 that 'everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by law of the union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal' ".
These are quite different from the previously discussed weak references because here the argument would break down if the reference to the Charter were deleted. One interpretation of this is that instead of claiming that the Charter is binding and then deriving the further claim that a given right is a binding principle of law, the exact opposite is done. A given right is established to be a binding principle of law, then it is located in an Article of the Charter, which is said to be non-binding. In this way, part after part of the Charter is shown to be binding. So far, no medium reference has revealed which parts of the Charter are non-binding.
In Baumbast the Court emphasises at 51 and at 59 that the Charter is not binding, but at 110;
" First, the unconditional nature of the first part of Article 18(1) EC entails that the right of residence must be a recognisable right of substance for citizens. In this respect Article 18 EC is in the nature of a guarantee provision. The article lays down requirements to be met by EC law in the area of freedom of movement for persons. The conditions laid down by EC law may not be arbitrary and may not deprive the right of residence of its substantive content. In that connection I refer to the requirements laid down by Advocate General Cosmas which are to be met by any conditions and limitations on the right of residence. I also find support for my view in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Article 45 of that charter which, as I have said, is non-binding recognises a right of residence in favour of citizens of the Union, whereas Article 52(1) provides as follows in regard to restrictions on the exercise of rights recognised by the Charter. They must "respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union ...".
Again, some of the strongest references in this category shade over into to the next.
"I know that the Charter is not legally binding, but it is worthwhile referring to it given that it constitutes the expression, at the highest level, of a democratically established political consensus on what must today be considered as the catalogue of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal order. On the right of property, Article 17 of the Charter states that: .... "
On one side of the balance there is the word "(non-)binding" on the other there are "highest level", "must today be considered", and "fundamental rights guaranteed". It would be difficult to come any closer to openly declaring the Charter to be binding.
Strong References
In view of the previous paragraph, the strong references might be renamed "stronger" references, because what separates them from medium references is just the absence of a qualification ("non-binding") that has no practical impact. Here is strong reference
"... The European Court of Human Rights has extended the scope of the guarantees laid down in Article 6 of the ECHR to administrative proceedings of a disciplinary nature.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU takes the matter further, since, in addition to providing that an accused is entitled to defend his legal position in a fair and public judicial procedure, before an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, it also provides that every person has the right to be heard by the institutions of the EU before any individual measure which could affect him or her adversely is taken and the right to have access to his or her file."
Article 6 TEU mentions the ECHR but not the Charter. Yet where it goes beyond the ECHR, the Court follows the Charter.
One of the strongest references to the Charter came in the well-publicised Hautala case;
"51. Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. …
73. At Community level, the principle of access to documents was confirmed, and its status and content defined, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. …
80. Naturally, the clearly expressed wish of the authors of the Charter not to endow it with binding legal force should not be overlooked. However, aside from any consideration regarding its legislative scope, the nature of the rights set down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes it from being regarded as a mere list of purely moral principles without any consequences. It should be noted that those values have in common the fact of being unanimously charted by the Member States, which have chosen to make them more visible by placing them in a charter in order to increase their protection. The Charter has undeniably placed the rights which form its subject matter at the highest level of values common to the Member States. …
82. The sources of those rights, listed in the preamble to the Charter, are for the most part endowed with binding force within the Member States and the EU. It is natural for the rules of positive Community law to benefit, for the purposes of their interpretation, from the position of the values with which they correspond in the hierarchy of common values. …
83. As the solemnity of its form and the procedure which led to its adoption would give one to assume, the Charter was intended to constitute a privileged instrument for identifying fundamental rights. It is a source of guidance as to the true nature of the Community rules of positive law. …
84. In this case, the link between Article 42 of the Charter and Article 255 EC is evidenced by the explanatory note to Article 42, which states that "the right guaranteed in this Article is the right guaranteed by Article 255 of the EC Treaty. It cannot be made more plain that the right contained in Article 255 EC is now clearly described as corresponding to a fundamental right within the meaning of the Charter."
In 51 the Charter is used as a source of a right that was then innovative in Europe, where official secrecy has historically trumped freedom of information. At 73 the Charter is placed alongside the Treaty of Amsterdam. Paragraphs 80, 82 and 83 present strong arguments for given legal force to the right to consult EC documents. Then, at 84, the fact that this same right also appears in Article 255 TEC is mentioned, followed by an explanation of why Article 42 of the Charter has played such a large role in the argument; the TEC contains rights, the Charter distinguishes fundamental rights from the ordinary ones.

Summary
Strong references show with certainty that the Charter is not adequately described by the words "not legally binding". Since it was not passed as legislation it cannot be a law and it cannot be binding in the way laws are. In consideration of the way in which the Courts are using it, the Charter might be described as "judicially binding". “The Court may come to confirm the legal status of the Charter in such a way that it would appear to be pointless to resist formal incorporation into the treaties. Some have already anticipated this development.”

The Charter and Equality
An early score card of Court references to the chapters of the Charter showed these results;
I. Dignity 1
II. Freedoms 8
III. Equality 0
IV. Justice 8
V. Solidarity 3
VI. Citizen's Rights 6.
In view of the “Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation” , based on Article 13 TEC, this score of zero for Chapter III was to be expected because the Directive pre-empted many Charter references by being more precise and concrete in its prescriptions. Article 6 TEU served as a complementary filter to keep references out of the Court’s case law by being more general and abstract than the Charter.

Three years after the Charter’s proclamation doubts about its relevance to equality litigation were removed. In Allonby v. Accrington AG Geelhoed writes that “ … The principal of equal treatment, laid down as a fundamental legal principal in Articles 13 and 141 EC and Articles 21(1) and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is an essential feature of that protection. That justifies specific action by the Community legislature under Article 141(3) EC. In my view such action may precede other measures to ensure the protection of workers for which under Article 137(2)(b) unanimity in the Council is required.” When a controversial measure can be adopted only by unanimity the perennial search for compromise in Council becomes more difficult because all constituencies and pressure groups are well aware that their government can block passage. If the measure passes, the government will have to confess to its lobbyists that it ultimately chose to not block. If the contested measure can be passed by qualified majority vote, governments can explain that they were unable to find a blocking minority in Council. Under such circumstances, an understanding pressure group might even forgive its Minister for having voted with the majority. When the coming ascession adds ten Member States to Council, it will become very difficult to find unanimity for equality measures more advanced than those already in force. This is an extremely strong reference to the Charter.
Summary
Within less than three years of the Charter’s proclamation, AG Geelhoed demonstrated how useful it can be for equality in his opinion in Alone.

Conclusion
First, Article 23 of the Charter takes the Community’s equality provisions beyond the frontiers of the labour market and into the realm of human rights. This result is all the more important because it is the culmination of four decades of legislation and litigation.

Second, the Charter is inter alia a clarification and consolidation of the two Courts’ case law on equal rights. It makes the essence of equality law more understandable for lawyers and other citizens.

Third, it has facilitated access to fundamental rights in practice through its provisions for transparency and good governance, which will make it more difficult find excuses for discrimination.

Fourth, in his recent opinion in Alonby, AG Geelhoed has pointed to a very useful link between Charter Article 23 and Article 141(3) TEU which will allow new equality provisions to be introduced once there is a qualified majority, without having to wait for unanimity.

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Table of Cases


Opinion C-204/00P Aalborg 2003-02-11
Opinion C-256/01 Allonby 2003-04-02
Opinion 2/94 Accession 1996 ECR I-01759
Case C35/83 BAT 1985 I-00137
Case C-413/99 Baumbast 2001-07-05
Opinion C-64/00 Booker 2001-09-02
Case C-177/01 Commission v France 2002 ECR I-05137
Case C-185/97 Coote 1998-09-22
Case C-353/99 P Hautala 2001-12-06
Case C-11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 1970 ECR I-01125
Case 222/84 Johnston 1986 ECR I-01651
Case C-450/93 Kalanke 1995 ECR I-03051
Case C-04-73 Nold 1974 ECR I-00491
Case T-377/00 Philip Morris 2003-01-15
Case C-29-69 Stauder 1969 ECR I-00419
Case C-50/00 P Union de Pequeños Agricultores 2002 I-06677





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